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TRANSCRIPT*
FIRST PANEL: The Law Schools'Response to Professionalism Issues
Presenters: Sammons and Alfieri
Responders: Crystal, Carter, Warren, and Heil
JACK L. SAMMONS, Griffin B. Bell Professor of Law, Mercer Law School.1
Law School Efforts to Enhance Professionalism
It occurred to me, after listening to this morning's speakers, that a
transition is needed before I begin my presentation. So here it is. When my
daughter was fourteen or so we caught her doing something she should not
have been doing. During our conversations about this she asked, as I am sure
your children have asked of you at some point, "Why shouldn't I lie?" If she
had been listening this morning the answer she would have heard is: "Because
you will be punished." The answer my wife and I gave her, however, and the
answer you have given your children is: "Because you would be a liar." You
give this answer, and you then hope that your child has been raised in such a
way that it is persuasive.
My understanding of professionalism is that it is concerned with the latter
response to unethical conduct. There is no doubt that the errant members of our
profession, of which there are many, are very much in need of punishment, and
I applaud the efforts of those who bring them in line. Professionalism,
however, is about a different way of understanding and of motivating ethical
conduct within a profession. The ethical motivation of legal professionalism
is the desire to be a good lawyer and the internal reward that comes from being
one. And now for what I was prepared to say.
I would like to start with a story, well known in certain circles, about one
of my intellectual mentors, Stan Hauerwas, a theologian at Duke Divinity
School. It is important to the story to know that Stan is a Texas theologian, but
not a George Bush "Why Don't We All Just Get Along" Texas Nice Guy. As
a theologian, he is more of a John Wayne straight shooter. And, as with Wayne,
he is charming enough to get away with it.
Stan was walking across the Quad at Notre Dame one morning when he
spotted some friends, a married couple, both Jewish, walking nearby and joined
them. Knowing that they had a son about to be of age he asked, "When is the
Bar Mitzvah?" The couple replied, "Well, we are not sure. We want Jacob to
* This Transcript was edited by editors of the South Carolina Law Review, as well as the
presenters and responders who participated in the Conference on Professionalism held in
Savannah, Georgia on October 20-21, 2000. The unabridged transcript from the conference is on
file with the South Carolina Law Review.
1. My thanks to Brad Wendel, Tony Alfieri, and Roy Stuckey for their thoughts on this
presentation.
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decide for himself that he wants to be Bar Mitzvah'd. He hasn't decided yet."
Stan retorted, "So, there have been 5750 years of Jewish history, Jewish
suffering, so that this twelve year-old can make up his mind? Could he have a
mind worth making up if he does not know his parents stand for something?"
As I said, Stan can get away with comments like this. And not only get away,
but succeed. Jacob had his Bar Mitzvah.
If after 2600 years or so of lawyering, dating, as I see it, from the pre-
Socratics, and if after my own almost thirty years in the practice of law and
almost twenty-five years of teaching legal ethics, I had nothing more to say to
my students than "it is up to you to make up your own mind about what good
lawyering requires of you," something, I think along with Stan, would be very
wrong.
Why do I tell you this story? Why do I make this point? Because it
explains why I have eliminated from my presentation today all of those
developments in law school courses and curricula that have increasing student
self-reflection as their explicit goal so that students will see that the ethics of
our practice are a matter of their own personal choice. I do not think these
developments, as interesting as some may be, have much to do with
professionalism. In the simplest of terms, there is surely nothing wrong with
encouraging people to stop and think about what they are doing, and this is
what most of these developments claim to be doing, but, I would suggest, what
the students think, when they stop and think, matters greatly if the goal is
increased professionalism.2 Rather than courses teaching self-reflection and
personal choice, I looked instead for courses based, at least in part, on the
authority of the tradition of the practice we are in together, the authority of that
ongoing conversation that the practice has had about itself over time in which
each generation of lawyers comes to know what it means to be a good lawyer.
This form of authority is, of course, definitional of the term "professionalism.
' 3
2. I did not put too fine a point on this in the talk, but, to be sure, I want to add now that I
am always puzzled how professionalism, which by definition must involve some recognition of
the moral authority ofa profession, is improved by asking twenty-somethings to choose what good
lawyering requires based on the values they bring with them to law school, values that are, of
necessity, inadequate to the task. It would be like going to a four-year conservatory and not
expecting your musical judgment to change for the better (in the only way in which we can
understand what "better" might be). Yet, you find exactly that argument made over and over again
in the literature on teaching legal ethics.
3. It is very easy for legal ethicists, self-selected as they are for concern for others, to fall
into the trap of thinking that respect for autonomy and for the opinions of others requires an
avoidance of all authority in the legal ethics course, including the authority Ihave described in this
talk. This trap is made even more inviting when legal ethics is taught through moral dilemmas. But
is this avoidance respectful of others in any true understanding of that virtue? Oh, I know,
anything other than just leaving the resolution of ethical issues up to the students can certainly
come across as authoritarian, and I have a long list of my own gaucheries in trying to avoid that,
but the authority offered in the kind of teaching I am suggesting here, and the kind of parenting
Stan suggested in the story with which I began this talk, is not the teacher's or parent's authority.
Instead, it is the authority of the tradition of the practice the students are entering, and it is
reflected in the particular forms taken by our self-critical conversations within the practice. At
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In preparing for today, I looked for pedagogical developments that would
tend towards an initiation of law students into the tradition of our practice, e.g.,
courses teaching the history of the practice and placing it within the rhetorical
tradition so that we know the story of which we are a part; courses carefully
exploring the rhetorical culture and language our practice maintains and
exactly what is required of us to maintain it; courses carefully explicating the
social goods carried by this rhetorical culture, most specifically the good of the
legal conversation itself, including the good of opposing voices being heard
and being heard equally; courses developing the particular character required
for excellence within our practice and the virtues, especially the virtue of
practical wisdom and the intellectual virtues of recognizing opposing
arguments, and moral affirmation in the face of the contingency and
complexity that our practice demands of its practitioners.
I looked especially for developments that would aid our initiates in seeing
our mutual dependence as lawyers in the ongoing project for which we are
professionally responsible. In a nutshell, I looked primarily for courses that
would help students appreciate the common goods oflawyering, the good upon
which all conceptions of professionalism and legal ethics depend at rock
bottom for their coherency.
What did I find? Truthfully now, since I am a lawyer? Not much. Surely
not enough. There are some schools taking more seriously through orientation
programs, the idea that our students are being initiated into a common project
with a very long tradition through orientation programs, often with the
assistance of the bar. You can also find an occasional required first-year course
on the legal profession. There are also some new programs, such as the one at
South Carolina that brings us together today, which seek to do more in this
regard, or older programs-the Intergenerational Legal Ethics Project at the
University of North Carolina, for example, in which oral histories are used to
much the same effect. But these are rare, and, to my knowledge, there is no law
school that takes appreciation of the common goods of lawyering seriously as
a three-year pedagogical project except in extremely amorphous ways.
On a much more positive note, however, there has been one central motif
to certain developments in teaching legal ethics over the past ten years that is
terribly important and can be made to serve the development of
professionalism as I have described it. This conception of professionalism
emphasizes, as I did a moment ago, the virtue ofphronesis or practical wisdom.
Practical wisdom, in turn, requires, as Iris Murdoch has taught us, a moral
vision, a truthfulness really, about the situations we are in as
least for me, the authority of the tradition of practice is similar to the authority the common law
method has over our students and over our teaching in their first-year courses and is no more
authoritarian than that authority is. In simplest terms, the tradition of the practice of law offers a
way of thinking about the ethical issues within the practice of law, just as the tradition of the
common law offers a way of thinking about legal disputes. Wouldn't it be surprising if this were
not true? And shouldn't we be teaching this?
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lawyers--especially atruthfulness about their complexity. For students to learn
to be truthful about the situations we are in as lawyers they must first be placed
in truthful lawyering situations, and this is what has been happening in legal
education over the past ten years.
This is a very widespread development, one I think best described as the
contextualization of the teaching of legal ethics. Now contextualization is
certainly not a panacea. Like the goal of self-reflection, it can serve many ends
and can be for better or for worse. Contextualization is often justified by the
professors using it as a means towards improved self-reflection and student
choice because, I think, good philosophical liberals that the professors are, they
are not sure what else would pass muster as a justification. I think, however,
that contextualization has an inherent tendency to move students in the
direction ofprofessionalization, although I certainly will not attempt to defend
that proposition this morning. I think that contextualization tends towards
professionalism whether the professor is using it for that purpose or not.
Contextualization has taken very many forms: starting early on in the
contextualization of the classroom discussions of the basic legal ethics course
with the use of the problem method, supplemented routinely now, thanks to
Professor Steve Gillers and many others, with videos and other ways of
offering more complete narratives of the problems studied. The use of the
problem method was followed by the organization of problems in particular
substantive areas of practice as in Professor Nathan Crystal's text, classroom
simulations such as those done by Professor Robert Bums at Northwestern or
the Profession of Law course at Columbia, the increasing use of practicing
attorneys in classroom discussion of problems, and, with all this, the
concomitant shift of focus in the course from ethical regulations to the broad
panoply of regulations, rules, constitutive rules of the practice, and customs
governing a lawyer's conduct and from simplistic rule compliance to complex
matters of professional judgment.
Beyond these changes in the basic course, several schools have developed
course progressions from basic to advanced legal ethics courses exploring very
particularized practice contexts. The work of Professors Bruce Green, Mary
Daley, and Russ Pierce at Fordham is the best known model of this, but there
are others, for example, the specialized ethics offering at the University of
Texas and Duke University. Another contextualization approach is to teach
legal ethics through clinical or skills offerings. The clinic, of course, has been
the home of a truer form of professionalization for a long time, but now this is
being done in a much more conscious and rigorous fashion in programs such
as Professor Jim Moliterno's at William and Mary or the clinical legal ethics
classes at Notre Dame or the Ethics/Lawyering Skills offerings at Loyola.
A few schools have developed a sequence of skill-based offerings,
focusing on a particular role of the attorney, in which the sequence is designed
to produce a progression towards a professional conception of the role. The
best example I found of this is the fledgling Moore Advocates Program at
Fordham now growing its feathers under the good direction of Professor Ian
[Vol. 52: 481
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Weinstein. But perhaps the most common of contextualization methods is
teaching ethics through what is called the pervasive method, in which legal
ethics are integrated into existing substantive offerings in one fashion or
another. Our own Professor Deborah Rhode is one of the champions of this
approach, and the success of the effort is indicated by the fact that the schools
attempting some form of the pervasive method are far too numerous for me to
mention this morning.
There are also a few schools in which contextualization, as a foundation
of teaching towards the profession, occupies a much more central role in the
overall design of the curriculum. My own school, Mercer Law School, I am
pleased to say, has been a leader in this effort, with a curriculum designed
backwards, that is, starting from an agreed upon conception of the professional
lawyer we wanted to produce.
I hope that this motif of contextualization spreads, and I think it might. I
hope we can see, in what I have described so briefly today, a beginning
tendency or, at least, the hint of a beginning tendency to move concerns with
professionalism from the periphery ofpedagogical decision-making toward the
center from which they came and to which they belong.
Some of the developments I have described, in fact, all of those that extend
beyond the ordinary course offerings, are extremely difficult to accomplish.
This is not news to the academics in the audience. More than half of the ones
I mentioned came about through the prompting of outside monies, primarily
the Keck Foundation. This will come as no surprise if you are at all familiar
with the politics of curriculum reform. Without outside sources, curricula
changes are always battles for limited resources. Because such battles can be
personal, fierce, and unpleasant, and because there is a tacit agreement among
law professors not to rock the boat too much since we are all floating very high
in the water these days, the kind of structured curriculum, progression of
courses, increased requirements, and sectionalization that professionalization
requires are damn near impossible to achieve. Add to this the disastrous notion,
encouraged by some hiring partners who are very confused about the
requirements of good lawyering, that law students should begin specialization
while in law school, and you can see the enormity of the problem facing any
proposal for change.
One way of avoiding the problem, however, is to establish programs
outside of the ordinary curriculum, and as I have said, to do so with outside
monies. There are now, thank goodness, a rather large number of these outside
programs-we recently created one at Mercer under the direction of Professor
Pat Longan-and Professor Tony Alfieri of the University of Miami will now
tell you about professionalism developments within them.
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ANTHONY ALFIERI, Professor and Director of the Center for Ethics and
Public Service, University of Miami School of Law:
Activities ofLaw School Centers on Professionalism
Thank you, Jack. Let me address three points on the subject of law school-
based professionalism centers: first, the nature of their activities; second, the
impediments to their growth; and third, the extent of their impact. Both
educational and aspirational in their mission, professionalism centers serve
multiple constituencies: traditionally students, the bar and bench, and alumni.
Descriptively, their activities encompass colloquia, scholarship, curriculum
development, and community service.
In the field of colloquia and scholarship, Fordham Law School's Stein
Center sets the pace. Led by Professors Bruce Green, Mary Daly, and Russell
Pearce, the Stein Center conferences have ignited a burst of energy in the ethics
literature. Programs at Hofstra, Harvard, Stetson, Cardozo, and here at South
Carolina add to this energy. Much of the early literature is surveyed in the fine
bibliography compiled by Stanford Law School's Deborah Rhode. However
noteworthy, the more recent literature lacks thoroughgoing accounts of the
function of race, ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation in ethics and the
lawyering process.
In the field of pedagogy, many increasingly heed Deborah Rhode's call for
the integration of ethics materials across the curriculum in both substantive and
skills courses. Fordham faculty have enhanced this curricula diversity by
fashioning advanced ethics courses in private and public law areas. Against this
background, the absence of a similar jurisprudential integration into ethics
courses seems inexplicable, especially given the import of feminist, Critical
Race, LatCrit, and Queer theory to legal practice. For those interested in ethics
integration outside of jurisprudence, Comell's Legal Information Institute
provides an invaluable resource for academics, students, and practitioners.
In the field of community service, both Fordham's Stein Center and the
University of Miami's Center for Ethics & Public Service are developing
hybrid models that integrate teaching, interdisciplinary research, and pro bono
outreach. Founded in 1996, Miami's Ethics Center is an interdisciplinary
project devoted to the values of ethical judgment, professional responsibility,
and public service in law and society. The Ethics Center provides training in
ethics and professional values to law school and university students as well as
to the Florida business, civic, education, and legal communities. It observes
three guiding principles in serving the cause of ethics, professional values, and
public service: interdisciplinary collaboration, public-private partnership, and
student mentoring and leadership training.
Staffed by more than 50 first, second, and third year law students serving
as fellows and interns for up to fifteen hours per week, the Ethics Center
operates five practice groups in the fields of ethics education, professional
training, and community service. The Bar & Bench Group offers continuing
[Vol. 52:481
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legal education training to Florida bar associations and nonprofit advocacy
organizations. The Education Group teaches ethics to faculty and students in
Miami-Dade County public and private high schools in weekly seminars and
in periodic study circles. The Workshop & Symposium Group sponsors
interdisciplinary seminars on the professions at the Law School and University.
The University Group supervises a leadership seminar series at the Law
School, sponsors an undergraduate ethics colloquium, and co-teaches a first
year ethics seminar at the University. The Pro Bono Group administers the
Community Health Rights Education Project, an integrated teaching, research,
and community service program providing health rights education to
underserved communities in cooperation with the Schools of Medicine and
Nursing, and the Community Economic Development and Design Project, a
community-based education and technical assistance program furnishing small
business counseling, economic development training, and economic justice
research to residents of low-income neighborhoods in collaboration with the
School of Architecture.
Despite their record of achievements, law school professionalism centers
confront serious impediments to their future growth and success. The greatest
impediment is, of course, funding. In lieu of a law school-supplied operating
budget, professionalism centers must pursue both hard and soft money
fundraising strategies. Fordham and South Carolina offer instructive lessons in
accumulating hard-money endowments. Miami affords a lesson in the travails
of mixed strategies: annual giving, donor gifts, foundation grants, and capital
campaigns. Mixed strategies require delicate maneuvering inside the law
school and university among administrators, faculty, and alumni, and outside
among members of the bar and bench, donors, foundations, and corporations.
For those pursuing mixed strategies, the best approaches emphasize cross-
disciplinary collaborations within the university and joint venture partnerships
without.
Impediments common to both soft and hard money fundraising strategies
stem from a culture of skepticism that oftentimes infects the media and
foundations. To gain appreciation and support for their work, professionalism
centers must educate the media locally, regionally, and nationally. Good media
relations are an acquired skill that must be cultivated personally and
professionally through networking by telephone, e-mail, mailings, and planned
events. The same holds true for foundations. Cultivating foundations by
regularly circulating annual reports, corresponding with in-house contacts, and
visiting national offices for informational briefings on priorities and funding
cycles promises constructive results for law schools at all ranks. Outreach of
this kind, though strategic, also constitutes an important community-building
exercise gratifying in itself.
Overcoming the challenges of financial underwriting, media outreach,
foundation support, and institutional politics in building a professionalism
center is often daunting and always exhausting. At the same time, the rewards
of educating law school and university students, collaborating with university
2001]
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administrators and colleagues in cross-disciplinary joint ventures, and forging
public private partnerships in organizing innovative forms of community
service are substantial and inspiring. In five short years, for example, Miami's
Center for Ethics & Public Service has helped to educate over three thousand
members of the Florida bar and bench, Law School, University, and civic
communities. Many other Centers represented here have accomplished equally
important objectives. We urge you and your law school to join this hopeful
movement in legal education. Thank you.
NATHAN CRYSTAL, Professor, University of South Carolina School of
Law:
I know other people have things to say, and I am sure members of the
audience have questions they want to ask, so I will limit my remarks to three
sentences, not including this first sentence. First, the professionalism
movement has been a major topic in the profession for at least ten years.
Second, the New York Times of August 17, 2000, reported a dramatic decline
in the number of pro bono hours by major national law firms; the top firm
declined from 220 hours to 105 hours. Third, if the professionalism movement
ignores market forces, it is doomed to be irrelevant.
RICHARD E. CARTER, Executive Director, ALI-ABA Committee on CLE,
and former Director, ABA Division for Professional Education:
Although I am tempted to take Roy's admonition that one need not make
any response, I would like to make a couple of observations. One is just to say
how overwhelmed I am at the number of offerings and the different things
going on in law schools. As someone who is a law school graduate pre-
Watergate, this is a phenomenal change. The only activity that I can remember
in my three years of law school was an intervention by the faculty shortly after
graduation-an intervention in the admissions process when one of the
members of my class was about to be turned down by a lawyer who was part
of the mandatory interview process for admission because this graduate had a
beard. That was the most we dealt within the issues of ethics and
professionalism. I suppose this is in keeping with the topic someone mentioned
this morning about outlandish dressing in the courtroom. This is another
example of professionalism rather than ethics.
Just a couple of observations that are really questions. I am not sure I heard
Professor Alfieri correctly when he talked about what was happening in the
clinical area. There seemed to be a greater diversion from using ethics in the
clinical setting. It has always seemed to me to be one of the best settings in
which to work with students on ethical problems. So I hope I heard that wrong.
I have one other observation with regard to Professor Sammon's mention of the
pervasive technique. You do not know how lucky you are to make a decision
about what you are going to cover and how you are going to cover it based on
[Vol. 52: 481
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your educational needs rather than on some regulation that says you must
separate out ethics for one hour or whatever, which is the reality of the world
in continuing legal education.
ALFIERI: I will respond to the good question on clinics. I am speaking as
a former clinical teacher or perhaps a current clinical teacher, given the hybrid
nature of the Center for Ethics and Public Service. The clinical movement and
individual clinical teachers are running nonprofit shops, for the most part, and
are busy at it. The focus on ethics tends to be secondary to the primary matter
at hand, direct services and law reform activities, whether it is in a clinical
setting or legal service/legal aid setting or a public interest nonprofit advocacy
setting. One of the questions that should be on our agenda is how to conduct
in a collaborative way some form of empirical and anecdotal studies to get a
sense of what is going on in the teaching of ethics, legal aid and services
offices, and in nonprofit and public interest law firms whether they be great or
small. To the extent that there is an absence of well-developed ethics and
professionalism programs, this is a wonderful opportunity to develop
innovative programs.
THE HONORABLE ROGER K. WARREN-President, National Center for
State Courts
Let me stir the pot a minute-I have not heard anyone address the
underlying issue: Exactly what problems and conduct on the part of lawyers are
all these efforts trying to address? I would like to follow up on Martha
Barnett's comments last evening.
Martha Barnett talked about the need for an outside, public perspective on
this issue and the need to build and improve public respect for lawyers and the
justice system. I am president of the National Center for State Courts. Our
mission is to improve court performance and improve public trust in the courts
and the justice system. Therefore, I, in effect, represent an outside perspective.
I have not toiled in the field of lawyer professionalism. The fact of the matter
is that the public does not distinguish between various elements of the justice
system. First, it does not distinguish between lawyers and other institutions and
actors in the justice system. Second, public distrust of lawyers is much, much
greater than that of any other element of the justice system. Third, and more
importantly I think, public attitudes about lawyers are one of the two or three
significant drivers of public attitudes about the justice system. It is their
attitudes about lawyers, more so than most other factors, that account for their
overall view of the justice system. That is, public distrust of lawyers is critical
in looking at the issue of public trust in the overall justice system. So much so,
as a matter of fact, that the National Action Plan to Improve Public Trust and
Confidence in the Justice System, which the National Center for State Courts
published last year as the result of a national conference co-chaired by Chief
Justice Tom Zlaket from Arizona, identified re-examination of the role of
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lawyers as one of the highest priority activities that had to be pursued at a
national level to address the issue of public trust and confidence in the justice
system.
Now, to take this matter a step further, I think it is important to examine
what the public does think about lawyers. What are the sources of the public's
dissatisfaction with lawyers? The sources of dissatisfaction with lawyers fall
into four categories. The first is what I would call commercialism. The public
thinks lawyers are greedy, that they are more interested in wealth than other
values, that they make too much money, that they charge too much, and.that
the cost of legal services is the principal reason that courts are unaffordable to
the vast bulk of the American public. Secondly, they feel that there is a culture
of self-promotion. The public thinks that lawyers typically promote their own
personal interest above the interest of their clients and of the public. Thirdly,
the public thinks lawyers are unethical-not judged by some standard of legal
ethics, I am talking about real ethics-that lawyers are dishonest, deceitful,
manipulative, and uncaring. In a 1993 survey by Peter Hart for the ABA, the
ethical standards of lawyers were compared by the public with the ethical
standards of automobile mechanics. Finally, what I would call the fourth
category, the sins committed in the name of zealous representation. This is the
imperative to "win at any cost." In my view, it is not so much what happens in
the courtroom, or in depositions, which is like the tip of the iceberg-one
percent-it is what happens in the transactions. It is the idea that to win,
someone has to lose. It is the idea that it is a zero sum game. It is paying too
little attention to the whole philosophy of win-win. It is that winning means
subduing the opponent rather than resolving the dispute or solving the
underlying problem.
I am not saying that other issues are unimportant: issues of legal ethics,
lawyer discipline, civility among lawyers, and competence. I am not saying
those issues are unimportant, but I think the issues that I previously described,
the issues that matter most to the American public, are paramount issues, and
that the real question is: What can law schools do to address these important
public issues?
Service is the criterion that distinguishes lawyers as a profession. But for
the concept of service, whether it is to a client, the public, or the body politic
as Martha Barnett put it, lawyers are not a profession. They are merely an
occupation or a business. The fundamental challenge facing lawyers and law
schools, in designing professionalism programs, is how to address the public
concern that lawyers are more bound by a pecuniary ethic and one of self-
promotion, than an ethic of care, an ethic of service. I think that is the
fundamental issue that professionalism programs in law schools are going to
have to address if they are going to address the issue of professionalism in the
bar in a way that responds to public cynicism about our justice system.
[Vol. 52:481
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
CAROLINE R. HEIL, Editor in Chief, South Carolina Law Review, USC
School of Law:
Just to follow up on the clinical idea of the education of ethics, and from
a student's perspective, I think one thing lawyers forget when they have been
out of law school for a while is that students do understand and seek guidance
and want, when we enter a professional responsibility class, to be told what we
can and cannot do. It is very frustrating when you read the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct to learn that they are very malleable, and you cannot get
any guidance on exactly how you are supposed to behave. In addition, I think
it is important for us to focus on what students fear when they leave law school
and enter the profession. I think we fear three things. These are things that we
discuss and actually talk about in law school.
The first fear is becoming the lawyers that we do not respect. No one in
law school expects to become an unethical or unprofessional lawyer. I think we
all fear the possibility of that happening without ever realizing it and without
being able to control it. On that note, the second fear is losing ajob because we
do not know that we are doing something wrong. The third fear is not having
the strength to report people we work under and whom we are taught to respect
and depend on. For this reason, I think we need a top-down approach to ethics.
We need to fix the legal profession to the degree that we feel comfortable
reporting each other and holding ourselves to a higher standard, so that students
who move into the profession are not afraid to be as professional and
responsible as they can possibly be. Therefore, from a student's perspective,
I want to remind you that even with clinical programs and centers and all of the
things we are discussing today, the bottom line is: You can "teach"
professionalism all day long, but students already understand it. We know. I
think most of us are good people and we know right from wrong. Instead, we
need the tools to be the people you are "teaching" us to be.
Thank you.
SECOND PANEL: The Judiciary's Response to Professionalism Issues
Presenters: Zlaket and Ramsey
Responders: Atkinson, Grey, Morrison, and Diminich
CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS A. ZLAKET, Supreme Court of Arizona:
The Conference of Chief Justices' 1997 National Action Plan on Lawyer
Conduct and Professionalism
Thank you very much and good morning. I am honored to be with you. I
would really like to talk about the subject you just introduced, but the program
says I am supposed to tell you about the Conference of Chief Justices' National
Action Plan on Lawyer Conduct and Professionalism. Before I do, I would be
remiss if I did not echo all the comments of my good friend, Judge Roger
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